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This paper draws a link between self-control problems and the contractual 
mechanisms of microcredit. We use a series of “lab experiments in the field” which 
were designed to elicit measures of time discounting on a sample of 573 individuals 
in rural Karnataka, India. Evidence from the experiments were integrated with 
individual survey data on the economic and financial lives of villagers. One third of 
participants made choices consistent with hyperbolic preferences (more impatient 
now than in the future), and would be made better off if they could discipline their 
time inconsistent preferences. While hyperbolic preferences have been often 
associated with saving behavior, we describe links to borrowing as well.  We find 
that “hyperbolic” women save a lower share of their savings at home and save less 
in total levels. Women with hyperbolic preferences are also more likely to borrow--
and to do so through microcredit institutions specifically.  The finding highlights 
the role of the fixed and frequent installment schedule ubiquitous in microcredit 
contracts. While microcredit contracts are celebrated for mitigating informational 
asymmetries, the evidence suggests that they also offer helpful structure for people 
with self-discipline problems who seek to accumulate capital but who lack suitable 
contractual saving devices.  
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The Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 celebrated the potential of microcredit to transform the lives of 
small-scale entrepreneurs by providing access to small loans.  Microcredit advocates argue 
that such access to credit will unleash the productive potential of poor households (Yunus 
2002).  Microcredit providers are drawn together by shared commitments to offer small-scale 
transactions, serve the under-served, and use innovative contracts to compensate for the fact 
that most customers lack collateralizable assets that can be used to secure loans (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2005).     
The success of microcredit, though, poses a puzzle: if the untapped economic returns to 
borrowing are so high, why don’t households save their way out of credit constraints?  New 
work in behavioral economics helps to answer that question by focusing on psychological 
conflicts that undermine efforts to save.  The focus has been on self-discipline problems that 
persist in the absence of savings devices that foster regular deposits and that limit 
withdrawals.  One of the hidden challenges faced by the poor is posed by the lack of access to 
such mechanisms. 
These behavioral insights suggest a new view of microcredit, and they point to an often-
overlooked feature of contracts that, in principle, provides a mechanism that substitutes for   2 
missing savings devices.  This is the near-universal requirement that loans be repaid in 
regular, frequent, fixed installments over time (Rutherford 2000, Armendáriz and Morduch 
2000).  An unusual feature of microcredit contracts is that borrowers must typically repay 
loans in weekly or monthly installments beginning at the very start of the loan, well before 
investments can be expected to bear fruit.  Money to pay installments must, of necessity, 
come at least in part from other income earned by households, such as from wage work.  The 
repayment process thus looks and feels much like the process of saving in regular increments 
from earned income.  To draw the link, Rutherford (2000) describes traditional saving 
behavior as “saving up”  and borrowing in this form as “saving down.”   In a textbook loan 
contract, by contrast, the principal and interest are paid in a single, large payment after profits 
are reaped.
1  
In drawing the link between microcredit borrowing and saving, we focus on specific problems 
that emerge when, intellectually, people value future consumption but they nonetheless give 
in to the temptation to consume today.  The internal tension is often depicted as a conflict 
between a patient “future self”  and an impatient “present self”  (Schelling 1984, Strotz 1955, 
Ainslie 1992), a tension captured parametrically by “hyperbolic”  discount rates rather than 
standard linear discounting (Laibson 1997).  Our findings relate hyperbolic preferences to 
microcredit borrowing.   
We study villagers in India who are the target customers of microcredit providers.  The 
microcredit banks in the villages are run on a “self-help group”  model promoted by the 
Government of India and inspired by Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the co-winner of the 
2006 Nobel Peace Prize.  We conducted a series of “lab experiments in the field”  designed to 
elicit measures of discounting and risk aversion for a random sample of 573 villagers spread 
across eighteen villages in two regions of Karnataka, a coastal state in South India.  (These 
are “artefactual field experiments”  in the classification scheme of Harrison and List, 2004.)   
                                                           
1 See Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) on the logic of microcredit repayment schedules, and Field and Pande 
(2007) for a field experiment from urban India.     3 
The questions were not hypothetical: the experiments concerned choices over relatively large 
stakes, as large as a week’s wage (as in Tanaka, et al 2006, and Binswanger 1980), and the 
structure of the questions allow us to infer intervals for discount rates and evidence of time 
inconsistency.  We construct measures of hyperbolic discounting and relate the measures of 
time discounting and risk aversion to survey data on the economic and financial lives of the 
households, including participation in microcredit organizations.   
The experiments identify roughly one third of the population as exhibiting choices consistent 
with hyperbolic discounting.  Those in this group discount the future more heavily when 
asked a series of questions about the preference to consume now versus in three months, 
relative to the degree of discounting implicit in how they answer similar questions about 
consumption in twelve months versus fifteen months.   
In our sample, women in the “hyperbolic”  group tend to hold a smaller share of their overall 
savings at home, a finding consistent with a desire to avoid the everyday temptation of 
depleting cash on hand.  Women in the hyperbolic group are also more likely than other 
women to join local microcredit organizations, and more likely to borrow from them (after 
controlling for their baseline degree of time discounting).  While we find that women are 
generally interested in opportunities to borrow, women with hyperbolic preferences are 
especially likely to do so via microcredit.  The results are robust to including a range of 
observable individual characteristics, evidence on seasonal income patterns, and measures of 
intra-family decision-making power.  
The evidence is consistent with the notion that microcredit borrowing offers helpful structure 
for people with self-discipline problems who seek to accumulate capital but who lack 
convenient contractual saving devices.  In a different world— one in which villagers weren’t 
vulnerable to time-inconsistent behavior and/or had attractive contractual saving devices— the 
households might only save (or at least would borrow less).  But in an imperfect world, the 
nature of microcredit contracts makes borrowing an alternative way to steadily transfer money   4 
to a bank and end up with a “usefully large sum”  (Rutherford 2000).  In this sense, borrowing 
and saving are drawn together as substitute mechanisms used toward similar ends. 
The next section describes self-help groups.  Section 3 describes the economics of self-
control.  Section 4 describes the sample selection, experimental design for eliciting subjective 
discount rates, and the survey data. Section 5 presents the empirical results on determinants of 
patience and time inconsistencies. Section 6 discusses how the experimental choices correlate 
with observed financial behavior and describes alternative hypotheses. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Self-Help Groups and microcredit 
Self-help groups (SHGs) are the main source of microcredit in India.  SHGs are the major 
providers of financial services in our sample, although moneylenders, banks, and postal 
savings schemes also operate in the communities. SHGs are based on groups formed 
endogenously in communities, sometimes facilitated by NGOs. The groups comprise 10-25 
people, and groups gather regularly, typically every week, to pool their savings and lend from 
their accumulated pot to members at an interest rate designed to cover costs (Seibel 2005).   
SHG expansion has been driven by an initiative of the government’s National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) to encourage linkages between non-
governmental organizations and commercial banks.  The SHGs are permitted as informal 
entities to obtain bank loans and the whole group is responsible for the loan repayment.  By 
March 2007, 2.92 million SHGs were providing services to 41 million members (NABARD 
2007).  
SHGs predominantly attract women, although no bias is built into the program design.  In our 
sample, 76 percent of group members are women.  The participation rate within our sample is 
46 percent and this number is very similar in both regions we study.  No village has fewer 
than 20 percent of individuals participating in an SHG.    5 
All SHG members must deposit regularly into compulsory savings accounts (deposits average 
Rs. 40 per month
2).  These accounts have tight withdrawal restrictions: savings may only be 
withdrawn when a member leaves a group or if there are exceptional circumstances. This kind 
of forced saving aids the SHG by creating collateral that can be tapped in times of trouble, but 
it is of limited immediate value as savings for customers.   
Two thirds of SHG participants have a loan, with an average size of Rs. 6,708 (about $170). 
The interest rate charged by banks to SHGs is about 20 percent annually; the interest rate for 
individual loans is at the discretion of SHGs and varies.  A recent survey of SHGs shows that 
83 percent of loans were used for production or other purposes— notably agricultural 
production, animal husbandry, and microenterprise--rather than consumption (Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor 2007).  
 
3. Self-Control and Financial Behavior  
The degree of time discounting is essential in making saving and investment decisions.  The 
behavioral economics literature has pushed further, based on experimental evidence that 
discount rates often vary with the time frame (Frederick et al. 2002).  In particular, people are 
often more impatient for current trade-offs than for future tradeoffs (Strotz 1955, Ainslie 
1992).  This is captured parametrically by hyperbolic (or “quasi-hyperbolic” ) time discount 
functions (Laibson 1997).  Hyperbolic preferences create a tension between future plans and 
current actions.  If individuals are “sophisticated”  enough to realize it, they may demand a 
commitment to “tie their hands”  now.  If they are “naïve”  and do not address their 
inconsistencies, individuals may later regret their decisions (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).   
For sophisticated people with hyperbolic preferences, for example, savings rates should rise 
when given the choice to opt into savings devices that incorporate commitments to save 
regularly and that limit withdrawals.  The cardinal feature of the devices is to keep present 
                                                           
2 At the time of our study the exchange rate was 40.6 Indian rupees per US dollar.   6 
temptations at bay by contracting to deposit money in fixed increments at pre-specified times.  
These kinds of devices take many forms.  In richer countries, the most common is direct-
deposited pension accounts; in poorer communities, a range of informal devices share this 
feature, including community-run savings clubs and rotating savings and credit associations 
(Rutherford 2000). 
Hyperbolic preferences have been invoked to explain a growing range of economic puzzles in 
poor countries. Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2005) observe patterns consistent with 
sophisticated hyperbolic preferences in their field experiments on fertilizer adoption, 
Mullainathan (2005) argues that time inconsistent preferences help explain erratic school 
attendance. Gugerty (2007) similarly interprets the widespread use of informal rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) as a commitment device to overcome time 
inconsistencies faced by savers. She observes that participants value public pressure to make 
regular saving deposits; as some ROSCA participants put it, “you can’t save alone.”  In 
keeping with this, Armendá riz and Morduch (2005) highlight difficulties saving at home, and 
they invoke savings difficulties as a rationale for why popular informal savings and borrowing 
institutions such as ROSCAs do not fall apart.  By keeping money at a distance or by 
imposing rigidity to its access, spending may be much less tempting in the presence of 
immediate pressures (Mullainathan 2005).  Basu (2007) uses hyperbolic preferences as the 
basis of a theoretical treatment that explains why individuals simultaneously save and borrow, 
a pattern commonly observed by microcredit practitioners. He argues that the existence of 
sanctions in the case of loan default provides incentives for discipline that make paying back a 
loan easier for individuals with hyperbolic preferences than regularly building up savings 
accounts. Self-control problems, although present around the world, may matter more in poor 
countries where immediate pressures are greater and mechanisms to help with self-control 
problems are more limited.   7 
Ashraf et al. (2006) illustrate the link between time preference inconsistency and savings 
rigidity. They offered savers of a rural bank in the Philippines the opportunity to save using a 
new product that differed from the existing ones only by restricting access of savers to their 
deposits until either given maturity or given amount was achieved. They find that 28 percent 
of those being offered the commitment product accepted it. Women who demanded the 
“commitment”  product were more likely to have hyperbolic time preferences— and access to 
such accounts notably increased their short-term saving. 
We turn here to the link between hyperbolic preferences and borrowing decisions. As noted, 
savings with commitment and paying credit in installments are very similar in terms of the 
pressure to follow an intended course of action by taking regular steps. For example, Strotz 
(1955) and more recently Laibson (1997) highlight this similarity.  Borrowing, though, is a 
roundabout way to save, and it is costly.  While most people expect to earn interest on saving 
deposits, evidence shows that people are willing to pay to save when options are limited.  The 
saving device tested in the Philippines, for example, was valued by the women although 
costly to them in that the accounts offer no extra compensation for the associated illiquidity.  
Similarly, in Ghana, local deposit collectors are a common part of the informal financial 
sector, charging customers a substantial fee for a simple, secure, disciplined ways to save.  
One calculation shows that in South India, a similar form of deposit collector who takes 
savings from their customers each day, returning the accumulation after 220 days, charges 
depositors a fee equivalent to 30 percent of deposits on an annualized basis.
3  In parallel with 
such devices, microcredit borrowing can be an effective next-best accumulation device. 
An alternative reason why the poor may demand commitments like these stem from 
household conflicts. In this case individuals do not seek to discipline their own preferences, 
but try instead to “discipline”  the preferences of other household members (often spouses).  
Anderson and Baland (2002) show that the need to protect savings from their husbands 
                                                           
3 See Rutherford (2000) and the discussion in Armendáriz and Morduch (2005).   8 
triggers women’s participation in ROSCAs in a Kenyan slum. They find a notable “inverted-
U”  shaped pattern in their data: women who have little autonomy from their husbands are 
unlikely to join ROSCAs, as are women with great autonomy (since they do not need the 
protections that ROSCAs afford). Women in a middle range, though, are particularly likely to 
be ROSCA participants.   In the work below, we find that the effect of hyperbolic preferences 
is robust to including measures of individual autonomy and power within households. 
 
4. Experimental and survey design 
Although much has been written about time discounting, experimental evidence is largely 
limited to laboratory environments in developed countries. A significant contribution is 
Harrison et al. (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008) who estimate the subjective discount rate 
among a representative sample of the Danish population. Several innovative studies, typically 
in low-income countries, employ experimental tasks to predict behavior outside of labs to 
study motivations behind behavioral choices.
4  In our study we are primarily interested in 
whether people with time inconsistent preferences behave differently from those having 
consistent preferences.  
 
Sample selection 
The survey design generated a varied sample of the rural population of Karnataka. Data were 
collected in June 2007 in cooperation with BPKS, an Indian NGO in Honavar and Haliyal 
taluks (a taluk is an administrative unit akin to a county, part of a larger district within a 
state). Honavar is a coastal region and, of the two, is more developed in terms of 
infrastructure, market access and access to education and financial facilities.  Figure 1 
                                                           
4 For example, Binswanger (1980) and Liu (2008) elicit individual attitudes to risk and observe correlations with 
agricultural behavior. Karlan (2005) uses the results of trust games to predict default among clients of FINCA.   
Tanaka et al (2007) take an approach similar to ours. Thomas and Hamoudi (2006) measure discounting, risk 
aversion, and altruism to study motivations behind inter-generational exchanges.   9 
provides a map and Table 1 compares the two taluks on a range of variables.  Nine villages 
were selected from each taluk, and 35 people were selected in each village using a random 
walk method.
 5  Those identified were invited to participate in the study, and 90 percent did.  
The total number of participants was 573, with no fewer than 25 participants per village. 
We used village meeting halls, typically schools, as field labs. The very high response rate 
stemmed in part from the support of village heads.  Self-selection concerns are limited by the 
high take-up rates.  
Table 2 compares the sample characteristics with Karnataka averages from 2001, restricted to 
the population older than 15 years. The average age and education levels are not statistically 
different, but we have a slightly lower proportion of illiterate respondents in our sample (40 
percent compared with 43 percent in the entire state).  This may reflect increases in 
enrollment ratios in 1980s and 1990s. Age of marriage is typically higher in urban areas that 
are included in the Karnataka average, while our respondents are villagers and therefore more 
likely to be married. Although the selection strategy was not intended to generate a 
representative sample of rural population of Karnataka, the sample captures its variety. 
Measuring discount rates and risk aversion 
We used a simple protocol to elicit discount rates, drawing on practices common in developed 
and developing countries (e.g. Harrison et al. 2002; Tanaka et al. 2006).
6 Respondents were 
asked to choose between receiving smaller amount earlier in time or larger amounts with three 
months delay. We start with: “Do you prefer Rs. 250 tomorrow or Rs. 265 three months 
later?”   
                                                           
5 The villages were randomly selected based on the 2001 Indian Census database; however, in three villages in 
each taluk the BPKS did not have a good access and knowledge of a village head. These were replaced with 
other villages that were similar in size, distance to town and educational facilities to the ones originally selected. 
6 In their surveying article Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) classify this methodology as the “choice task 
method.”  For a discussion on relative advantages of using “choices task method”  vs. alternative “matching-task 
method”  see Frederick et al. (2002). Our decision was largely made on the basis of simplicity given the low 
education levels in the area.   10 
We posed five such questions to each individual, with each question increasing the future 
amount up to Rs. 375 while keeping the earlier amount constant.  We thus made the choice to 
delay increasingly more attractive in each subsequent binary choice (Table 3, Panel A gives 
the choices). The point at which an individual switches from choosing the earlier reward to 
the future reward gives an interval of her discount rate. In the analysis we use the arithmetic 
means of these intervals to approximate individual discount rates (for specific values see 
Table 5). Five percent of respondents switched more than once, and nothing could be inferred 
about their discount rate. Such choices are uncorrelated with observable characteristics and 
the respondents were excluded from the analysis, reducing our sample to 544. 
The same set of binary choices was also offered at a future time frame (as in Ashraf, et al.  
2006).  Here, we started with: “Do you prefer to receive Rs. 250 in one year’s time or Rs. 265 
in one year and three months?”   (See Table 3, Panel B.)  We denote the discount rate 
calculated from the current tradeoffs as the “current discount rate,”  and that calculated from 
the future tradeoffs as the “future discount rate.”  Inconsistencies provide evidence of 
hyperbolic preferences, as discussed in the next section. 
Several design features in the elicitation methodology allow us to identify time preference 
reversals (differences between current and future discount rates) with greater confidence. 
First, we shifted the time frame by exactly one year to reduce the effects of seasonality of 
agricultural incomes and season-specific expenditures (e.g., annual celebrations).  
Second, we introduced a short delay in the current income option in the earlier time frame. 
This “front end delay”  method should control for potential confounds due to lower credibility 
and higher transaction costs associated with future payments (it is used, for example, by 
Harrison et al. 2002; Pender 1996).  If participants lack confidence that they will receive a 
reward in the future, they may prefer a current reward irrespective of their actual discount 
rate. Therefore no payments were made on the day of the experimental session. Instead,   11 
participants were making choices between Rs. 250 delivered the next day and a higher amount 
delivered after three months.  The approach also reduces transaction costs differentials 
between the options; since all payments are in the future, participants should assign the same 
subjective transaction costs to both options. 
Third, the set of binary choices in the future time period (with a one year delay) were asked 
immediately after the set of choices offered in the earlier time frame.  This sequencing should 
lead to a conservative estimate of the likelihood of time preference reversals since it biases 
toward consistency.   
Individual attitudes to risk were also elicited in order to control for the curvature of utility 
function. We have used a near replication of the simple protocol designed by Binswanger 
(1980) in his study of villagers in South India and later used by Barr (2003) in Zimbabwe. 
Each participant was asked to select one out of six different gambles. Every gamble yielded 
either a high or a low payoff with a probability 0.5.  In each subsequent gamble the expected 
value increased jointly with the variance. The sizes of the prize were set at the level of time 
discounting choices. The expected value of the least risky gamble was set at Rs. 250, and the 
higher payoff in the most risky gamble was Rs. 1000. The prizes for all the gambles are in 
Table 4.
7  
Much care has been devoted to ensuring a correct understanding of experimental choices 
given the high proportion of illiterate respondents. Ten trained research assistants were on 
hand to help illiterate respondents. Before the experimental choices were made, the 
experimenter informed the participants that at the end of the session each of them would have 
                                                           
7 We used two sets of prizes to elicit risk aversion.  The relative proportions in the gambles were exactly the 
same, but amounts for the second set of gambles were lower, with the expected value of Rs. 30 for the least risky 
gamble and with the maximum payoff of Rs. 120 for the most risky gamble. In the analysis we control for risk 
aversion inferred from gambles with higher amounts, which were set on a level comparable to time discounting 
choices.   12 
a 20 percent chance of being paid according to one of their choices.
8 He then explained the 
principle of future payments and simulated the randomization procedure - tossing numbered 
ping-pong balls from a bag – which would determine whether and according to which choice 
a participant would be paid.
9  
At the end of a session, randomly selected respondents were rewarded. Payments relating to 
risk aversion questions were disbursed immediately. For time discounting questions, winning 
participants received a cash certificate signed by the chief of the NGO, a local leader and a 
social worker familiar in the community. The prizes were deposited by the NGO and the 




Table 5 describes definitions of variables used in the analysis. A wide range of information on 
individual characteristics was collected such as age, education, family background (marital 
status, household head, and woman’s position in the household), economic conditions and 
financial behavior. We constructed an index approximating wealth using principal 
components analysis based on information about items at home, characteristics of the house 
and land possession. A set of questions on decision-making power and on attitudes about wife 
beating was used to approximate women’s position within households (Jensen and Oster 
2007). Again we used principle components to construct an index. Data on individual savings 
in a bank, a post office, at home and participation in SHGs together with information on 
borrowing indicate individual financial behavior. 
                                                           
8 A similar incentive technique was used, for example, by Botelho et al. (2006) in a lab experiment conducted 
among students in Timor-Leste.   
9 In 12 villages, the experimenter was the director of the cooperating NGO, in six remaining villages the main 
instructor was the associate director who was also present at previous meetings as a research assistant. The 
results reported below do not change substantively after controlling for experimenter effect (not reported). 
10 In addition, everyone was given a participation fee amounting Rs. 60 to compensate for opportunity costs 
(daily income). One session lasted on average four hours and these payments were made upon completion of the 
entire session.   13 
  
5. Determinants of time discounting  
We focus on four characteristics resulting from the experiments: current patience (based on 
Table 3, Panel A), future patience (based on Table 3, Panel B), present-biased time 
inconsistency (hyperbolic discounting) and future-biased time inconsistency (“patient now, 
impatient in the future” ). In this section we examine how observable characteristics (gender, 
age, education, wealth, income fluctuations, family status) predict these traits. In Table 6 we 
compare means for different subgroups. In the regression analysis we use OLS for discount 
rates and probits for time preference reversals. Observations are clustered at the village 
level.
11  
Determinants of discount rates 
We observe two clear relationships with respect to levels of patience as approximated by the 
level of discount rates.  First, women make more patient choices than men.
12 Table 6  shows 
that the current three-months discount rate is 27.0 percent for men but only 21.8 percent for 
women. For the future discount rate the averages are 22.6 percent and 15.9 percent 
respectively. For both discount rates the differences are significant at the 1 percent level. The 
results accord with evidence on behavior from developing countries showing that income in 
the hands of women is more likely to be used for future-oriented activities like education and 
health expenditures (Thomas 1990; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003) rather than current 
consumption.  Similarly, the positive experience of microfinance institutions with women is 
often attributed to women’s greater patience (Yunus, 2002). Thomas and Hamoudi (2006) 
                                                           
11 Using an ordered probit instead of OLS yields comparable results. The results also do not change substantively 
after controlling for village fixed effects (not reported). 
12  During the experimental meetings the participants were given a lunch.  We noticed that most women did not 
eat the meal, but waited until the end of the session and brought it home to share with their children. Men ate the 
lunch immediately.   14 
also find greater patience in women relative to men in a recent experimental study in rural 
Mexico. 
Second, as in Kirby et al. (2002) and Bauer and Chytilová (2007), we find that more educated 
individuals are more patient, an effect that is particularly strong for men (Table 6). The mean 
of the current discount rate for men with above median education is 19.7 percent, while for 
below median education it is 33.8 percent. For women, the effect is only marginally 
significant, possibly due to the substantially lower variance in education of women (45 
percent of women are illiterate in the sample).  
In the first three columns of Table 7, the dependent variable is the current discount rate, and it 
is the future discount rate in the next three columns.  The regression specifications yield 
similar conclusions as the table of means.  Each additional year of schooling is associated 
with a decrease in the current discount rate of 1.3 percentage points and a decrease in the 
future rate of 1.5 percentage points.  These are only associations, of course, since the 
relationship is in part endogenous: education can reduce income constraints or enhance 
planning skills and, all else the same, patient individuals are more likely to invest in 
education. 
Determinants of time-inconsistent preferences 
We interpret the choices as “hyperbolic”  if the inferred current discount rate is higher than the 
future discount rate: an individual with hyperbolic preferences is more impatient now than in 
the future. We further distinguish between individuals with weakly hyperbolic preferences 
and strongly hyperbolic preferences.  Weakly hyperbolic preferences reflect a difference 
between current and future discount rates that is relatively small, resulting from choosing the 
future reward only one binary choice earlier in future time frame (Table 3, Panel B) compared 
to earlier time frame (Panel A). If the difference is larger, a person is regarded as having 
strongly hyperbolic preferences.    15 
Table 8 illustrates definitions of the time inconsistencies and describes their distribution. The 
current discount rate is on the vertical axis and the future rate is on the horizontal axis. Cells 
on the diagonal (where the current discount rate equals the future discount rate) represent 
individuals with time consistent preferences. Below the diagonal, the current discount rate is 
higher than the future discount rate. An individual is considered as “weakly hyperbolic”  if she 
made a combination of choices that are next to the diagonal and as “strongly hyperbolic”  if 
combinations lie further below the diagonal.
13 Above the diagonal are individuals with future-
biased time inconsistency, in which individuals are more patient now than in the future. 
 
Almost one third of individuals have hyperbolic time preferences (19.9 percent are strongly 
hyperbolic and 13.2 percent are weakly hyperbolic), whereas fewer than 10 percent of 
individuals are more patient now than in the future.  
The first 6 columns of Table 9 show the determinants of hyperbolic preferences. Few 
observable characteristics explain hyperbolic time inconsistency. Women who are married or 
are household heads are more likely to have strongly hyperbolic preferences. The coefficients 
have an opposite sign and are not statistically significant for women having weakly 
hyperbolic preferences.  None of the variables would predict time inconsistency of men with 
statistical significance. These (non-) results are similar to estimates of Ashraf et al (2006) and 
other psychological studies on impulsiveness that similarly find little association with 
observable characteristics. 
                                                           
13 Note that the inferred discount rates are not linearly increasing (to limit censoring for a given number of binary 
choices).  Hence, the definition of being “weakly hyperbolic”  includes individuals with changes in discount rates 
between the two time frames that vary by different absolute amounts. As a robustness check, we redefined the 
dividing line between strongly and weakly hyperbolic preferences. In the first variant, we define “strongly 
hyperbolic”  individuals as those whose preferences change by more than 0.09 from the range of discount rates 
associated with time consistent choices.  This variant makes very little difference both in terms of the number of 
observations defined as strongly hyperbolic and, not surprisingly, in the results. In the second variant, we define 
“strongly hyperbolic”  individuals as having a current discount rate higher than the future discount rate by more 
than 0.16 units.  Doing so decreases the size of the group by 26 observations and reduces the differences in 
behavior between strongly and weakly hyperbolic described in Section 6, but the basic results hold.   16 
There are two major concerns to consider before interpreting the observed reversals as 
indications of hyperbolic preferences.  First, the preference reversals may mirror cash flow 
fluctuations between the earlier and the delayed time frame. Agricultural income is likely to 
fluctuate between seasons within a particular year. Similarly, local celebrations are organized 
on an annual basis with fixed dates. To address this concern, we deliberately shifted the time 
frame by exactly one year. The remaining concern then reduces to the role of income or 
expenditure fluctuations across years, such as those resulting from extremely adverse weather 
conditions. If farmers experienced or expected relatively bad harvest this year compared to 
their usual harvest, they could become more impatient now than in the future. According to 
official standards and data from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of 
Karnataka, the cumulated rainfall since the monsoon until the end of the survey was “normal”  
in both Honavar and Haliyal Taluks, and when asked directly, most of local leaders indicated 
that the present rainfall did not substantially differ from previous years.  Moreover, being a 
farmer does not predict a higher likelihood of having hyperbolic preferences.  As a further 
check, participants were asked to select the major unexpected shock during the last five years; 
42 percent selected low harvest due to bad weather, but this characteristic also fails to predict 
preference reversals. 
Second, the reversals may reflect expected transaction costs and lower credibility of future 
rewards resulting in a higher discount rate now and lower discounting in the future. As noted 
earlier, we mitigate this concern by designing the binary choices so that there are no 
immediate payments and by putting the responsibility for future payments into the hands of 
respected individuals familiar to the participants. In order to test if the reversal is driven by 
lack of trust we also included three questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) on 
“trust” , “fairness”  and “helping”  into our survey.
 An index from these questions is 
uncorrelated with both weakly and strongly hyperbolic preferences (p-value=0.39 and 0.34, 
respectively) as are the elements taken separately. Similarly, individuals with no previous   17 
interaction with the cooperating NGO -- and hence those presumably less inclined to trust it -- 
are not more likely to have hyperbolic preferences. Moreover, if the credibility issue was the 
driver of time preference reversal, the hyperbolic preferences should not be correlated with 
financial behavior, which contradicts our observations shown in the next section. 
Columns 7, 8, and 9 of Table 9 show how individual characteristics predict being patient now 
and impatient in the future. Although men are more likely to have future-biased preferences 
than women (10.6 percent compared to 8.5 percent), no independent variable explains the 
reversal in their case. Women with less wealth are more likely to be more patient now than in 
the future. We show in the next section that people with this type of preferences are also 
substantially less financially active in terms of both borrowing and saving. The most plausible 
explanation is differential uncertainty about cash flow now and after one year. If a person near 
the subsistence level knows her cash flow is now above subsistence but feels uncertain about 
cash flow next year, she may become less impatient about her choices now than in the future. 
Unfortunately this is impossible to test without data on relative riskiness of individual income 
streams. 
 
6. Discounting and Financial Decisions 
The heart of the paper links the non-laboratory borrowing and savings decisions to the 
experimental choices observed in the field labs. We test several hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that more patient individuals save more and are more likely to favor long-term 
savings goals. Second, individuals with hyperbolic preferences have saving difficulties. They 
recognize the tension between their current and future levels of patience and adjust their 
financial strategies.  Specifically, they reduce the share of savings held at home (where 
temptation is greatest) and they seek commitment devices like SHG loans.  If contractual   18 
savings devices had been available in this sample, we would expect to demand for them as 
well. 
 Table 10 presents the summary statistics on saving and borrowing for individuals with 
varying degrees of patience and time consistency.  We follow-up the analyses of means with 
regression analyses.  The upper panel in Table 10 shows the results for women, the lower 
panel focuses on men. On average, the level of self-reported financial savings (in a bank, post 
office, SHG and at home) is Rs. 2,016 for women and 3,113 for men. Individual savings rise 
with patience as reflected by the discount rate in the later time frame (i.e., Table 3, panel B). 
The total savings of women with time-consistent preferences are Rs. 2,305, whereas women 
with strongly hyperbolic preferences save only Rs. 1,636, which suggests the existence of 
saving difficulties for women with hyperbolic preferences. For men, we observe no real 
difference, which suggests that men may have better mechanisms for addressing time 
inconsistencies. For both men and women, a lower proportion of savings is held at home if 
individuals have hyperbolic preferences, which accords with the hypothesis that 
“sophisticated”  individuals will avoid keeping savings at home. 
Levels of patience also help to predict the purpose of savings. We define the purpose of 
savings as being future-oriented if it is (self-reported) primarily motivated by desires to pay 
for agricultural investment, business, education, or medical procedures; it equals zero if 
savings are mainly for basic consumption (celebrations, personal items, household 
equipment).  More patient individuals are, as expected, more likely to report a future-oriented 
savings goal. Women with a discount rate below the median future discount rate, for example, 
are 24.7 percentage points more likely to have future-oriented savings goal.  
We observe sharp differences also for borrowing. For both men and women, the likelihood of 
borrowing rises with hyperbolic preferences and, in general, the level of future patience. The 
difference is particularly striking for women’s borrowing from SHGs: 60.7 percent of women   19 
with strongly hyperbolic preferences have a loan from a SHG compared to only 35.9 percent 
when women are time consistent.
14  
Preference reversal in the opposite direction (more patient now than in the future) predicts 
low saving levels and low borrowing activity, which complies with our earlier observation 
that these individuals are very poor. 
 
Savings and borrowing: Regression results 
In the textbook case of financial decision-making with time consistent preferences, the 
choices of individual i depend on her discount rate
t
i D , her level of risk aversion i R , and both 
observed and unobserved conditioning factors, i X  and  i e .  Thus the outcome i Y is a simple 
function: 
) , , , ( i i i
t
i i X R D f Y e = . 
We capture these relationships in a linear regression specification, adding variables to capture 
departures from the textbook case: 






i i X R F H H D Y e b b b b b b b + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 , 
where  i Y  is the financial behavior, 
t
i D is a discount rate, 
s
i H is a dummy indicating a strongly 
hyperbolic individual, 
w
i H  is a dummy for being weakly hyperbolic,   i F  is a dummy for 
future-biased time inconsistency (dummy for time consistent preferences is omitted),   i R  is a 
dummy for being risk averse,  i X  is a vector of observable characteristics and  i e  is an error 
                                                           
14  It could be argued that the link between experimental choices and financial behavior results from arbitrage 
behavior in which individuals make choices in the experiments predicated on their ability to borrow against the 
future expected income from the pay-outs.   In other words, they engage in arbitrage between the lab and their 
outside opportunities to borrow.  For example, an impatient person could choose to wait in the experiment and 
receive a higher expected pay-out, but then borrow outside and repay the loan after receiving the pay-out.  If 
arbitraged perfectly, the discount rate inferred from the experimental choices should be equal to the market 
interest rate independently of the individual’s level of patience. While theoretically possible, arbitrage is unlikely 
to drive our results. First, although the amounts in our experiments were relatively large, they are still well below 
the minimum loan size from SHGs or the formal sector. Second, arbitrage should eliminate time inconsistent 
choices for people with better opportunities to borrow, but a substantial proportion of individuals made time 
inconsistent choices in our experiments and these individuals are more likely to have a loan (and hence 
presumably have better access to borrowing), a result inconsistent with the arbitrage argument.   20 
term for individual i. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  (Only minor changes 
in the results occur when we control for village fixed effects; Appendix, Table A1).  
In general, more patient individuals are more likely to save.  The behavioral economics 
literature complicates this notion by introducing multiple selves.  We start by considering 
someone with hyperbolic preferences interested in saving. To capture the role of time 
inconsistencies, we run the specifications with two variations.  In one, we use the current 
discount rate (based on questions in Table 3, Panel A) as a reference point, so 
t
i D = 
0
i D .  In 
the second variant, we include the future discount rate (Table 3, Panel B), so 
t
i D = 
1
i D .  When 
we control for the current discount rate, 
0
i D , the coefficients  2 b  and 3 b  will estimate the 
difference in financial behavior for a hyperbolic person relative to the level predicted for a 
person with time consistent preferences and a similar level of patience in the current period. A 
large and significant coefficient on the hyperbolic indicators ( 2 b  and 3 b ) suggests that the 
current self does not prevail.  Similarly, controlling for the future discount rate 
1
i D  gives a 
comparison to a future self.   
Ashraf et al. (2006) use a related specification in their analysis of a commitment savings 
product— with a slightly different interpretation. To see the difference, consider the case when 
there are only two values of each discount rate – high and low. There are then four types of 
individuals: patient and time consistent, impatient and time consistent, hyperbolic (current 
discount rate high, future discount rate low), and time inconsistent with a future bias (current 
discount rate low, future discount rate high).  
Ashraf et al. (2006) apply the following specification:  




1 0 . 
The coefficient  3 a  estimates the effect of being hyperbolic relative to time consistent or 
future biased individuals (here, it is not possible to also identify the coefficient on the dummy 
for being future-biased). A comparable version of our specification (1) can be written as   21 
i i i i
t










0 , where t=0,1.  The difference is that we include 
only one of the discount rates and add the dummy for future biased individuals. When we 
control for current patience, the coefficient 
’
3 b  indicates a difference in behavior between the 
hyperbolic group and the time consistent impatient group, and it can be shown that 
2 3
’
3 a a b - = . In the second version, where we control for future patience, the behavior of 
hyperbolic group is contrasted to the time consistent patient group and  1 3
’
3 a a b + = .  Our 
specification generalizes this simple set-up. 
In the analysis we compare how the behavior of the hyperbolic individuals departs from that 
of time consistent individuals, conditional on their level of patience. Two natural benchmarks 
arise: the level of patience associated with current patience (current self) and the level 
associated with future patience (future self). In equation (1) our two coefficients for 
hyperbolic preferences directly capture these departures, whereas the coefficient in Ashraf et 
al (2006) compares hyperbolic individuals to the average behavior of the group of time 
consistent and future-biased individuals.
15  
If individuals completely give in to their immediate temptations— that is, they are “naïve”  
hyperbolics— saving behavior should follow their current discount rate (i.e., 
0
i D ).  The 
indicator variable for being hyperbolic should not enter strongly in the regression (i.e., 
0 3 2 = = b b ), since saving behavior will be captured by the discount rate.  But households are 
unlikely to be completely naïve.  If they are “sophisticated,”  they appreciate the implications 
of  ,
1 0
i i D D „ and adjust their behavior to the extent they can given the available mechanisms.  
In this case, commitment mechanisms might lead them to a situation in which a regression 
that has the future discount rate in it (i.e., 
1
i D ), also yields that  0 3 2 = = b b .  In this case, 
temptations would be completely held at bay.  The parallel regression with the current 
                                                           
15 See Appendix Table A2 for results from a specification in the spirit of Ashraf et al. (2006), in which both 
current and future discount rates are included instead of the dummy for future-biased preferences.   22 
discount rate (
0
i D ) would yield that  . 0 3 2 > > b b   “Sophisticated”  hyperbolics might also 
over-compensate by applying commitment devices that lead to even higher levels of saving 
than their future discount rates would suggest (a class of “sophisticated”  behavior highlighted 
by O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999); here, 0 3 2 > > b b in the regression anchored by the future 
discount rate
1
i D .  
An alternative situation, in which “sophisticated”  individuals have no way to commit to 
saving, could result in their giving up and saving even less than the level predicted by current 
patience (i.e., 0 , 3 2 < b b  when controlling for current patience).   Here, individuals recognize 
that in the future they will have to permanently fight not to over-spend so they choose not to 
save so much in the first place (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). 
 
The same patterns should hold for microcredit production loans, given the premise that they 
are investments and, due to the structure of microcredit contracts, entail delayed gratification. 
As with saving, people with hyperbolic preferences who do not recognize the tension with 
their future selves (or who are powerless to act), will simply follow their current discount 
rate
0
i D .  Sophisticated individuals, when armed with effective commitment devices, will 
diverge from the pattern suggested by
0
i D .  In the villages we study, the structure of 
microcredit loans can make them useful commitment devices for individuals seeking better 
ways to accumulate. Using a similar argument as in the case of saving with commitment, 
sophisticated hyperbolics would then be even more likely to borrow than predicted by the 
preferences of their future selves (i.e.,  0 3 2 > > b b  when controlling for
1
i D ).  The same 
pattern could reflect, directly, the need by hyperbolic borrowers to compensate for their 
saving difficulties.  If this latter motivation drives behavior, then hyperbolic preferences 
should increase the demand for all loans, rather than microcredit loans specifically, a result 
we do not find for women.   23 
 
Saving 
Men and women who are more patient as predicted by the experiments save more.  While for 
men hyperbolic preferences make little difference to overall saving levels (columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 11), they do for women.  The evidence is consistent with men having better tools to 
cope with time inconsistencies.  Specifically, hyperbolic women save substantially less than 
their future patience, as captured by 
1
i D , suggests (Table 11, columns 3), a result that holds 
after controlling for observables.  We see that via  0 2 < b .  When controlling for current 
patience 
0
i D , the coefficient for being hyperbolic is smaller and not statistically significant 
(column 1). This suggests that women’s saving behavior follows their current patience level 
more closely than their future patience level. The results are qualitatively similar for weakly 
hyperbolic women, though measured with greater uncertainty. As expected, wealthier 
individuals report higher saving levels and more educated men also report significantly higher 
savings.  
Preferences should also affect the purposes of saving. Table 12 turns to determinants of the 
self-reported purpose of savings. Similarly to Table 7, more patient men and women have 
more “future-oriented”  savings goals, i.e.  0 1 < b .  Having hyperbolic preferences matters 
relatively less.  For hyperbolic women, future patience is a better predictor of the purpose of 
savings as indicated by positive significant coefficients on the hyperbolic indicators when 
controlling for current patience (column 1) and negative and not significant coefficients when 
controlling for future patience (columns 3). For hyperbolic men, current patience is a more 
accurate predictor of savings goals (columns 2 and 4).  In general household heads and 
women are more likely to have future-oriented savings goals, as are married individuals and 
people with more education.   24 
Hyperbolic preferences should, though, affect how people save.  In Table 13 we examine 
home savings as a share of total savings. We hypothesize that people with self-discipline 
problems are more likely to keep their money outside of the home.
16  More impatient 
individuals save a higher proportion of their savings at home and less outside of their 
household (such as in a bank, a post office, or SHG), in part because more impatient people 
save less overall (and saving less is associated with holding more at home).  But the finding is 
also consistent with a higher priority placed on spending which diminishes the value of 
opening and using saving accounts.   
Controlling for all of that, hyperbolic women adjust their savings practices to keep at home a 
lower proportion of their financial savings than the level predicted by their current selves 
(column 1). That is  0 2 < b . The future discount rate is a better predictor of their saving 
practices (column 3).  
In sum, the experimentally-derived discount rates yield plausible predictions about saving 
behavior: patient people save more and have more “future-oriented”  saving goals.  Hyperbolic 
women save less than their future level of patience suggests they should.  They do, though 
seem aware of the tension (and thus are not fully “naïve” ).  The clearest evidence thus far is 
seen in their systematically saving less at home. 
 
Borrowing 
The role of hyperbolic preferences continues to mark financial decisions when we turn to 
borrowing behavior.  Hyperbolic people borrow more, a result consistent with both the greater 
need for borrowing to compensate for low saving levels and for workable commitment 
devices.  As we show below, hyperbolic individuals have a particular demand for microcredit 
                                                           
16 There are 82 individuals who report not having any savings (see Table 10 for more details on their 
characteristics) and it is not clear how to treat the share of home saving among non-savers. In Table 13 they were 
excluded from the sample. In order to see the bounds of how important this exclusion is, we repeated the same 
analysis with non-savers treated as if (1) they saved 100% at home and (2) they saved nothing at home. In both 
cases the results are qualitatively similar to those observed in Table 13. In particular, strongly hyperbolic women 
save significantly less at home than predicted by their measured patience in the current period.   25 
loans through SHGs, a finding that suggests the importance of commitment devices.  As noted 
in the introduction, SHG loans have the advantages (in terms of disciplining mechanisms) of 
weekly loan installment schedules and  public repayments within the villages. 
In Table 14 we analyze the determinants of having a loan from any source: from a bank, a 
SHG or a moneylender. Patient women borrow more, a result in keeping with the working 
assumption that the loans are mainly taken for business investments and other forward-
looking investments.
17  For women, being married, middle-aged, less educated, and having 
recently experienced a shock at the harvest increases the likelihood of borrowing. 
Strongly hyperbolic women are 20 percentage points more likely to have a loan compared to 
the level predicted by the patience of their current self (column 1) and the coefficient on being 
hyperbolic is positive though not statistically significant when controlling for the preferences 
of the future self (column 3).  
Although for men we also observe a positive correlation between being hyperbolic and having 
a loan, we can push the analysis further on the sample of women. First, borrowing by men is 
mainly restricted to banks, while there is substantial SHG borrowing activity among women 
in our sample (42.6 percent have an SHG loan versus only 13.9 percent of men). In addition, 
we didn’t find lower savings for time-inconsistent men as we did for women, which suggests 
that they have other ways to cope with self-discipline problems not available to women. 
We begin by studying how being hyperbolic affects the choice between different types of 
loans. In Table 15 the dependent variable is equal to one if an individual has a loan from an 
SHG. We can see that the results for women’s discounting and borrowing in Table14 were 
largely driven by SHG loans. Strongly hyperbolic women are 36.4 percentage points more 
likely to borrow from SHGs than predicted by their current level of patience (column 1).  
                                                           
17 Introductory economics tells us that patient individuals save more, and the impatient borrow more.  That 
intuition fails, though, when we turn to the billions of people around the world, especially the poor, whose 
income derives largely from farming or small-scale business.  As self-employed entrepreneurs, these households 
borrow often to support their farms and businesses.   26 
In columns 5-8, we restrict the sample only to individuals who have a loan (independently of 
its provider) and do the same analysis. This restriction thus conditions on the generic demand 
for a loan and places the focus on loan type.  Importantly, we still observe similar results for 
hyperbolic discounting. Conditional on borrowing, strongly hyperbolic women are more 
inclined to borrow from SHGs, which is consistent with the hypothesis that features specific 
to SHG contracts and practices are desirable for individuals with hyperbolic preferences. 
(SHG loans may have other advantages relative to alternative loans types, such as lower 
interest rates, but our focus here is on features that are particularly appealing to hyperbolics.)  
When future patience levels,
1
i D , are included in the specification, strongly hyperbolic women 
borrow at a rate even higher than those discount rates suggest. The result is explained by the 
combination of the disciplining effect of SHG loans and the desire to compensate for lower 
savings levels.  
 
The interpretation above centers on self-control issues, and the results are robust to extending 
the specifications to include a measure of women’s position within a household (to capture 
“spousal control”  issues).  Spousal control can be another motivating factor for why women 
seek commitment mechanisms; i.e., to keep money from husbands whose spending 
preferences vary from those of their wives (Anderson and Baland 2002). Theory predicts that 
women who have little autonomy from their husbands are unlikely to use a commitment 
device, as are women with substantial autonomy (since they do not need the protection of 
commitment).   
As found by Anderson and Baland (2002), the action here comes from women with a mid-
level of autonomy.  We find evidence supporting the spousal control motive for borrowing 
behavior, but not for savings behavior. Women in the third quartile of our measure of 
women’s position are the most likely to have a loan from SHGs (Table 15).  The result 
suggests that husbands or other family members respect women’s autonomy over resources   27 
from SHG loans but less so for savings or other types of loans.  The results on hyperbolics are 
little changed by this extension. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The textbook model of optimal consumption choice abstracts from self-discipline problems 
that households may face, limiting their ability to save.  Behavioral economics has taken this 
as a focus, centering on ways that various contracting mechanisms can generate greater 
savings levels by promoting discipline.  We draw a link between these kinds of disciplining 
mechanisms and the propensity to borrow from microcredit institutions.   
The study is based on results from a series of “lab experiments in the field”  designed to elicit 
measures of time discounting and risk aversion and survey data on financial behavior for a 
random sample of over 500 individuals in rural India. We show that women’s choice to 
borrow in general, and the propensity to do so through local microcredit institutions 
specifically, is greater for women with hyperbolic preferences.   
After controlling for the general preference for consuming today versus in the future, we find 
that women with time preferences exhibiting “strong”  hyperbolic discounting save lower 
proportion of their savings at home (in keeping with self-discipline difficulties) and save less 
in total levels.   
Borrowing through microcredit institutions can provide a partial solution to these problems.  
They provide a way to accumulate that is structured and regulated both by SHG loan officers 
and by fellow villagers. 
The finding that hyperbolic women favor borrowing from SHGs can be partly explained by 
their difficulty saving, so they are less likely to be able to rely on their own resources for 
capital.  Hence, the hyperbolic group is more likely to need to borrow than otherwise similar 
people undertaking comparable investments. Another explanation that has been a particular   28 
focus above, is that the structure of microcredit loans provides a way to convert income flows 
into large sums through a device that— for the hyperbolic group— is more effective than the 
alternative of saving up.  A third explanation is that the hyperbolic group is giving in to their 
desire for current consumption, driving up loan demand.  Our result, though, holds even after 
controlling for the baseline degree of time discounting; the time preference variable should 
capture aspects of loan demand associated with the desire for current consumption.  
The analysis rests on the way that microcredit loans provide discipline and peer pressure 
absent in the textbook lending contract.  Microcredit contracts have been celebrated by 
economic theorists for providing novel solutions to problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  The evidence here suggests that a key to their success may rest as well with their 
role in helping borrowers discipline their financial lives.  The evidence helps to explain the 
puzzling existence of the regular repayment schedules used in nearly all microfinance loan 
contracts globally (Armendáriz and Morduch 2005).  The evidence also helps to explain why 
microfinance institutions that drop the joint liability element of group lending from their 
contracts nonetheless have maintained regular repayment schedules and group meetings (Gine 
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Table 1: Honavar and Haliyal Talukas - Descriptive Statistics 
Honavar Haliyal
Total population 160,331 105,851
Number of villages 92 111
Rural literacy rate (%) 74 60
Total population/primary schools 629 868
Total population/secondary schools 5,529 15,122
Total population/bank facilities 4,581 26,463
Villages having post office (%) 63 28
Villages with paved road connection (%) 72 60  
Note: Source: Indian Census 2001 
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Table 2: Sample characteristics, comparison with Karnataka averages (means, standard 
deviations) 
Total Male Female Honavar Haliyal Karnataka*
Age (years) 36.822 38.128 35.496 36.759 36.885 36.300
(11.756) (12.091) (11.274) (11.060) (12.443)
Education (classes) 4.256 5.004 3.496 5.967 2.519 4.200
(4.442) (4.684) (4.051) (4.487) (3.658)
Illiterate 0.395 0.339 0.452 0.204 0.589 0.425
(0.489) (0.474) (0.499) (0.404) (0.493)
Married 0.786 0.796 0.777 0.729 0.844 0.670
(0.410) (0.404) (0.417) (0.445) (0.363)
Farmer 0.702 0.739 0.664 0.632 0.772 0.750**
(0.458) (0.440) (0.473) (0.483) (0.420)
Sample size 544 274 270 274 270  




Table 3: Eliciting discount rates (payoffs) 
Tomorrow After three months
Earlier reward Delayed reward
choice 1 250 265
choice 2 250 280
choice 3 250 300
choice 4 250 330
choice 5 250 375
After one year
After one year and three 
months
Earlier reward Delayed reward
choice 1 250 265
choice 2 250 280
choice 3 250 300
choice 4 250 330
choice 5 250 375
Panel A (current discount rate)





Table 4: Eliciting attitude to risk (payoffs) 
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Table 5: Definition of variables 
Variables Definition Mean Std 
dev
Experimental choice s
6 values approximating 3-months discount rate in earlier
time frame:
0.03 = if discount rate < 6%; 0.09= if6% < discount rate <
12%; 0.16 if 12% < discount rate < 20%; 0.26 = if 20% <
discount rate < 32%, 0.14 if 32% < discount rate < 50%;
0.6= if 50% < discount rate
6 values approximating 3-months discount rate indelayed
time frame:
0.03 = if discount rate < 6%; 0.09= if6% < discount rate <
12%; 0.16 if 12% < discount rate < 20%; 0.26 = if 20% <
discount rate < 32%, 0.14 if 32% < discount rate < 50%;
0.6= if 50% < discount rate
Strongly hyperbolic dummy; 1= current discount rate >> future discount rate, as 
defined in Table 9
0.199 0.399
Weakly hyperbolic dummy; 1= current discount rate > future discount rate, as
defined in Table 9
0.132 0.339
Patient now, impatient in the future dummy, 1= current discount rate < future discount rate 0.096 0.294
Risk aversion dummy, 1= if risk aversion above median (i.e. selects 
gamble (250,250) or (225,475) or (200,600)), 0= if risk 




Loan Dummy; 1 = has an outstanding loan; 0 = doesn’t have an
outstanding loan
0.597 0.491
SHG loan Dummy; 1 = has an outstanding loan from SHG; 0 =
doesn’t have an outstanding loan from SHG
0.281 0.450
Total savings Rs. th. (savings in bank + savings in post office + SHG
monthly contribution*average length of participation +
home savings)
2.569 5.454
Share of home savings Home savings /Total savings (%, only those who save) 0.333 0.386
Future oriented purpose of savings Dummy; 1 = if the major purpose of savings is future-
oriented (agricultural investment, business, education,
doctor); 0 = if it focuses on current consumption
(celebration, personal items, household equipment)
0.546 0.498
Socioeconomic characteristics
Female Dummy; 1 = female; 0 = male 0.496 0.500
Age Age in years 36.822 11.756
Education Years of schooling completed 4.256 4.442
Married Dummy; 1 = married, divorced or widow; 0 = single 0.851 0.357
Household head Dummy; 1 = household head; 0 = non household head 0.397 0.490
Position in the family Position of a woman in a family. Index calculated by
principal component analyses from seven questions on
decision-making and five questions on wife’s beating.
Minimum of the index is set to zero. The higher the index
value, the better the position.
3.617 1.887
Wealth index Wealth index calculated by principal component analyses
from questions on type of house, electricity connection,
land ownership and dummies for possesion of 14 types of
household equipment
0.000 1.893
Income in June < income in Sept. Dummy; 1 = if income inJune < income inSeptember; 0 =
if income in June >= income in September
0.496 0.500
Current discount rate 0.244 0.228
Future discount rate 0.193 0.221
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Table 6: Experimental questions and individual characteristics (means, standard deviations) 
All
Total Total Total
Low High Young Old Low High Low High Young Old Low High
Patience
Current discount rate 0.244 0.218 0.241 0.191 0.205 0.234 0.236 0.197 0.270 0.338 0.197 0.259 0.281 0.307 0.232
(0.228) (0.212) (0.223) (0.195) (0.207) (0.218) (0.219) (0.202) (0.239) (0.254) (0.199) (0.242) (0.237) (0.248) (0.225)
Future discount rate 0.193 0.159 0.180 0.135 0.164 0.154 0.186 0.133 0.226 0.294 0.152 0.230 0.221 0.267 0.184
(0.221) (0.193) (0.209) (0.170) (0.202) (0.183) (0.209) (0.173) (0.240) (0.267) (0.182) (0.247) (0.234) (0.259) (0.213)
Time consistency
Strongly hyperbolic preferences 0.199 0.207 0.223 0.189 0.192 0.226 0.222 0.187 0.190 0.204 0.174 0.164 0.216 0.188 0.191
(0.399) (0.406) (0.418) (0.393) (0.395) (0.420) (0.417) (0.391) (0.393) (0.405) (0.381) (0.372) (0.413) (0.392) (0.395)
Weakly hyperbolic preferences 0.132 0.141 0.128 0.156 0.123 0.161 0.148 0.134 0.124 0.085 0.167 0.121 0.127 0.101 0.147
(0.339) (0.348) (0.336) (0.364) (0.330) (0.369) (0.357) (0.342) (0.330) (0.279) (0.374) (0.328) (0.334) (0.303) (0.355)
Patient now, impatient in future 0.096 0.085 0.095 0.074 0.103 0.065 0.111 0.060 0.106 0.099 0.114 0.129 0.082 0.101 0.110
(0.294) (0.280) (0.294) (0.262) (0.305) (0.247) (0.315) (0.238) (0.308) (0.299) (0.319) (0.336) (0.276) (0.303) (0.314)
Attitude to risk
Risk averse 0.452 0.470 0.446 0.500 0.493 0.444 0.511 0.425 0.434 0.479 0.386 0.421 0.448 0.449 0.419
(0.498) (0.500) (0.499) (0.502) (0.502) (0.499) (0.502) (0.496) (0.497) (0.501) (0.489) (0.496) (0.499) (0.499) (0.495)
Male Female
Education Age Wealth Education Age Wealth
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Table 7: Determinants of discount rates 
Dependent variable
All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.070 -0.095
(0.033)** (0.031)***
Age -0.013 -0.019 -0.007 -0.009 -0.017 -0.001
(0.007)* (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)** (0.008)
(Age)
2 1.5e-04 2.2e-04 7.7e-05 8.4e-05 1.7e-04 -3.6e-06
(8.0e-05)* (1.4e-04) (1.2e-04) (6.0e-05) (7.6e-05)** 9.4e-05
Education -0.013 -0.018 -0.007 -0.015 -0.022 -0.007
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)
Wealth 8.5e-04 2.2e-05 0.004 0.002 0.006 5.5e-04
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Income in June < income in Sept. -0.011 -0.041 0.018 -0.020 -0.051 0.012
(0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028)* (0.029)
Farmer -0.008 -0.035 0.017 -0.021 -0.029 -0.012
(0.019) (0.028) (0.032) (0.017) (0.027) (0.024)
Negative shock from harvest 0.032 0.036 0.032 0.045 0.035 0.056
(0.027) (0.028) (0.041) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036)
Married 0.032 0.048 0.042 0.031 0.076 0.005
(0.035) (0.073) (0.065) (0.041) (0.062) (0.061)
Household head -7.4e-05 -0.020 0.034 -0.014 -0.036 -0.022
(0.032) (0.042) (0.070) (0.037) (0.056) (0.063)
Constant 0.547 0.717 0.306 0.483 0.693 0.201
(0.117)*** (0.217)*** (0.150)* (0.079)*** (0.111)*** (0.102)*
Observations 538 272 266 538 272 266
R-squared 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.04
Current discount rate Future discount rate
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS, standard errors corrected for 
clustering at the village level. For columns 1, 2, 3 the dependent variable is the “current discount rate”  calculated 
from the binary choices between amount next day and after three months. It has 6 values calculated as arithmetic 
means of inferred ranges of discount rate. For columns 4, 5, 6 the dependent variable is the “future discount rate”  
calculated from the binary choices between amount after one year or amount after one year and three months.   39 
Table 8: Distribution of responses to time preference questions (number of observations, %) 
 
Patient Impatient Total
DR=0.03 DR=0.06 DR=0.16 DR=0.26 DR=0.41DR=0.60
Patient DR=0.03 126 8 6 2 2 9 153
23% 1% 1% 0% 0% 2% 28%
DR=0.09 37 41 3 1 4 86
7% 8% 1% 0% 1% 0% 16%
DR=0.16 27 18 41 4 5 95
5% 3% 8% 1% 1% 0% 17%
DR=0.26 14 7 12 11 3 3 50
3% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 9%
DR=0.41 1 6 2 4 4 2 19
0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 3%
Impatient DR=0.60 34 1 11 5 1 89 141
6% 0% 2% 1% 0% 16% 26%
Total 239 81 75 27 19 103 544
44% 15% 14% 5% 3% 19% 100%
13.2% of individuals "Weakly hyperbolic": More patient over future tradeoffs than current tradeoffs (next to the diagonal)
19.9% of individuals "Strongly hyperbolic": More patient over future tradeoffs than current tradeoffs (further off the diagonal)
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Table 9: Determinants of time preference reversals 
Dependent variable
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female 0.005 0.052 -0.058
(0.050) (0.064) (0.034)*
Age 0.014 0.008 0.020 -0.010 -0.004 -0.019 0.007 0.011 0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013)
(Age)
2 -1.3e-04 -6.7e-05 -2.1e-04 1.3e-04 7.1e-05 2.1e-04 -1.2e-04 -1.8e-04 -3.1e-05
(1.1e-04) (1.4e-04) (2.1e-04) (8.1e-05) (1.3e-04) (1.4e-04) (7.6e-05) (1.3e-04) (1.7e-04)
Education 0.003 0.005 0.001 -1.2e-04 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Wealth 0.002 0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 0.001 -0.010 -6.2e-04 -0.030
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.005)* (0.010) (0.009)***
Income in June < income in Sept. 0.026 0.037 0.015 -0.003 -0.043 0.036 -0.020 -0.049 -0.005
(0.034) (0.051) (0.049) (0.033) (0.051) (0.038) (0.024) (0.039) (0.044)
Farmer -0.060 -0.047 -0.077 0.061 0.046 0.079 -0.006 0.005 -0.032
(0.030)** (0.045) (0.037)** (0.046) (0.056) (0.064) (0.030) (0.049) (0.046)
Negative shock from harvest 0.030 0.033 0.027 -0.052 -0.052 -0.055 -0.008 -0.002 -0.023
(0.038) (0.044) (0.053) (0.044) (0.065) (0.064) (0.024) (0.042) (0.034)
Married -0.077 -0.029 -0.141 0.027 -0.018 0.133 0.033 -0.109
(0.070) (0.076) (0.112) (0.030) (0.119) (0.054)** (0.033) (0.096)
Household head -0.037 -0.027 -0.074 0.071 0.036 0.294 -0.047 0.040
(0.046) (0.090) (0.052) (0.059) (0.081) (0.160)* (0.036) (0.044)





Patient now, impatient in the 
future
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Probit, marginal effects reported, standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. In column 
1,2,3 the dependent variable "strongly hyperbolic preferences" equals to one if the current discount rate is higher than the future discount rate and the difference is "large" (see 
Table 8).  Hence, these individuals exhibit hyperbolic time preferences. In column 4,5,6 the dependent variable "weakly hyperbolic preferences" equals to one if the current 
discount rate is higher than the future discount rate and the difference is "small" (see Table 8). In column 7, 8, 9 the dependent variable equals to one if the future discount rate 
is higher than the current discount rate. Hence, these individuals exhibit time inconsistency, but not in the direction associated with hyperbolicity.   41 












Loan  0.641 0.688 0.557 0.768 0.632 0.621 0.478
(0.481) (0.465) (0.499) (0.426) (0.489) (0.487) (0.511)
SHG loan 0.426 0.457 0.371 0.607 0.447 0.359 0.391
(0.495) (0.500) (0.486) (0.493) (0.504) (0.481) (0.499)
SHG loan (conditional on borrowing)0.665 0.664 0.667 0.791 0.708 0.579 0.818
(0.473) (0.474) (0.476) (0.412) (0.464) (0.496) (0.405)  
Saving
Having any savings 0.863 0.884 0.825 0.857 0.842 0.876 0.826
(0.345) (0.321) (0.382) (0.353) (0.370) (0.331) (0.388)
Total savings (Rs. th.) 2.016 2.198 1.691 1.636 2.069 2.305 0.936
(2.736) (2.646) (2.875) (1.788) (3.808) (2.849) (0.952)
Share of home savings 0.191 0.182 0.208 0.164 0.148 0.194 0.306
   only those having any savings (0.303) (0.291) (0.326) (0.278) (0.260) (0.307) (0.388)
Future-oriented purpose of savings  0.591 0.680 0.433 0.589 0.632 0.579 0.609
(0.493) (0.468) (0.498) (0.496) (0.489) (0.495) (0.499)
Number of observations 270 173 97 56 38 153 23
MEN
Borrowing
Loan  0.555 0.585 0.520 0.654 0.559 0.541 0.448
(0.498) (0.494) (0.502) (0.480) (0.504) (0.500) (0.506)
SHG loan 0.139 0.163 0.110 0.173 0.059 0.157 0.069
(0.346) (0.371) (0.314) (0.382) (0.239) (0.365) (0.258)
Saving
Having any savings 0.836 0.884 0.780 0.827 0.794 0.855 0.793
(0.371) (0.321) (0.416) (0.382) (0.410) (0.353) (0.412)
Total savings (Rs. th.) 3.113 3.350 2.839 3.221 3.206 3.267 1.967
(7.154) (6.375) (7.979) (5.148) (5.093) (8.539) (2.682)
Share of home savings 0.479 0.442 0.527 0.440 0.375 0.500 0.546
   only those having any savings (0.407) (0.399) (0.415) (0.432) (0.353) (0.414) (0.376)
Future-oriented purpose of savings  0.502 0.517 0.484 0.346 0.559 0.516 0.643
(0.501) (0.501) (0.502) (0.480) (0.504) (0.501) (0.488)
Number of observations 274 147 127 52 34 159 29
Time consistency Future discount rate  42 
Table 11: Total savings (Rs. th.) 
 
Dependent variable
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strongly hyperbolic -0.422 0.333 -0.933 0.058
(0.413) (0.731) (0.447)* (0.791)
Weakly hyperbolic -0.679 -0.618 -0.843 -0.983
(0.628) (1.008) (0.650) (1.153)
Current discount rate -1.309 0.479
(0.740)* (1.520)
Future discount rate -2.036 -1.622
(0.882)** (1.978)
Patient now, impatient in future -1.165 -0.860 -0.768 -0.727
(0.438)** (0.719) (0.390)* (0.664)
Risk averse -0.088 0.718 -0.071 0.706
(0.281) (0.765) (0.287) (0.761)
Age 0.265 0.351 0.262 0.316
(0.090)*** (0.185)* (0.091)** (0.194)
(Age)
2 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001)** (0.002)* (0.001)** (0.002)*
Education -0.020 0.226 -0.025 0.185
(0.057) (0.087)** (0.057) (0.077)**
Wealth 0.406 1.131 0.409 1.141
(0.164)** (0.385)*** (0.161)** (0.395)**
Income in June < income in Sept. 0.279 -0.480 0.298 -0.574
(0.264) (0.735) (0.268) (0.777)
Farmer 0.153 0.109 0.144 0.038
(0.392) (1.116) (0.379) (1.101)
Negative shock from harvest -0.097 -0.170 -0.038 -0.097
(0.412) (0.874) (0.418) (0.865)
Married 0.280 4.218 0.277 4.358
(0.481) (2.344)* (0.495) (2.385)*
Household head 0.721 -5.230 0.732 -5.302
(0.704) (1.881)** (0.670) (1.878)**
Position in the family 0.069 0.069
0.240 0.240
(Position in the family)
2 -0.008 -0.007
(0.025) (0.025)
Constant -2.881 -5.203 -2.670 -3.702
(1.238)** (3.754) (1.271)** (3.926)
Observations 249 272 249 272
R-squared 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.24
Total savings (Rs. th.)
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS, standard errors corrected for 
clustering at village level. Total savings are calculated as a sum of savings on a bank account, in a post office, 
contributions to SHGs and financial savings held at home. 
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Table 12: Future-oriented purpose of savings 
Dependent variable
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strongly hyperbolic 0.130 -0.106 -0.068 -0.252
(0.078)* (0.080) (0.081) (0.101)**
Weakly hyperbolic 0.014 -0.011 -0.037 -0.027
(0.077) (0.107) (0.075) (0.111)
Current discount rate -0.615 -0.479
(0.142)*** (0.160)***
Future discount rate -0.591 -0.389
(0.176)*** (0.189)**
Patient now, impatient in future -0.048 0.059 0.087 0.194
(0.134) (0.119) (0.128) (0.114)*
Risk averse -0.073 -0.075 -0.085 -0.077
(0.098) (0.083) (0.101) (0.085)
Age 0.044 -0.029 0.044 -0.027
(0.021)** (0.022) (0.021)** (0.022)
(Age)
2 -6.5e-04 3.4e-04 -6.5e-04 3.2e-04
(2.8e-04)** (2.4e-04) (2.8e-04)** (2.4e-04)
Education 0.024 0.005 0.024 0.006
(0.013)* (0.011) (0.013)* (0.011)
Wealth 0.029 0.009 0.028 0.010
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
Income in June < income in Sept. 0.121 0.034 0.121 0.034
(0.055)** (0.075) (0.061)** (0.076)
Farmer 0.077 0.101 0.073 0.110
(0.074) (0.122) (0.072) (0.121)
Negative shock from harvest 0.039 0.197 0.050 0.184
(0.096) (0.084)** (0.096) (0.083)**
Married 0.236 0.008 0.225 0.022
(0.133)* (0.114) (0.134)* (0.116)
Household head 0.369 0.180 0.373 0.174
(0.087)*** (0.093)* (0.084)*** (0.092)*
Position in the family 0.246 0.250
(0.098)** (0.100)**
(Position in the family)
2 -0.030 -0.030
(0.014)** (0.015)**
Observations 248 271 248 271
Future oriented purpose of savings
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Probit, marginal effects reported, 
standard errors corrected for clustering at village level. Future-oriented purpose of savings is a dummy variable 
equal to 1, if the major purpose of savings is future-oriented (agricultural investment, business, education, 
doctor), and equal to 0, if it focuses on current consumption (celebration, personal items, household equipment).   44 
Table 13: Share of home savings 
 
Dependent variable
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strongly hyperbolic -0.313 -0.147 -0.089 -0.045
(0.146)** (0.124) (0.079) (0.108)
Weakly hyperbolic -0.056 -0.010 -0.003 0.029
(0.090) (0.097) (0.085) (0.096)
Current discount rate 0.655 0.187
(0.235)*** (0.342)
Future discount rate 0.605 0.358
(0.265)** (0.369)
Patient now, impatient in future 0.273 0.061 0.129 -0.022
(0.123)** (0.134) (0.113) (0.143)
Risk averse -0.169 -0.046 -0.155 -0.042
(0.088)* (0.086) (0.091)* (0.086)
Age -0.058 -0.001 -0.060 0.002
(0.022)*** (0.030) (0.023)*** (0.030)
(Age)
2 6.2e-04 2.3e-06 6.5e-04 -2.9e-05
(2.6e-04)** (3.5e-04) (2.7e-04)** (3.5e-04)
Education -0.006 -0.041 -0.006 -0.038
(0.010) (0.013)*** (0.010) (0.013)***
Wealth 0.017 -0.086 0.018 -0.087
(0.021) (0.022)*** (0.020) (0.022)***
Income in June < income in Sept. 0.116 -0.069 0.119 -0.060
(0.059)* (0.113) (0.059)** (0.116)
Farmer 0.094 0.284 0.098 0.286
(0.101) (0.130)** (0.100) (0.128)**
Negative shock from harvest -0.158 0.032 -0.164 0.032
(0.114) (0.117) (0.116) (0.115)
Married 0.278 -0.424 0.283 -0.441
(0.138)** (0.151)*** (0.136)** (0.150)***
Household head 0.336 0.085 0.327 0.094
(0.187)* (0.152) (0.182)* (0.149)
Position in the family 0.006 -0.003
(0.081) (0.084)
(Position in the family)
2 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.011)
Constant 0.896 0.895 0.937 0.769
(0.558) (0.622) (0.582) (0.638)
Observations 213 227 213 227
Share of home savings
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Tobit (lower limit = 0; upper limit =1), 
standard errors corrected for clustering at village level. Share of home savings is equal to home savings divided 
by total savings. Only respondents with positive total savings are included.   45 




Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strongly hyperbolic 0.203 0.142 0.085 0.168
(0.075)*** (0.074)* (0.086) (0.078)**
Weakly hyperbolic -0.007 0.071 -0.050 0.100
(0.082) (0.060) (0.085) (0.060)*
Current discount rate -0.340 -0.021
(0.133)** (0.147)
Future discount rate -0.514 0.149
(0.188)*** (0.164)
Patient now, impatient in future -0.246 -0.070 -0.143 -0.087
(0.120)** (0.123) (0.107) (0.130)
Risk averse 0.052 0.212 0.061 0.213
(0.068) (0.061)*** (0.067) (0.063)***
Age 0.068 0.017 0.067 0.020
(0.019)*** (0.018) (0.020)*** (0.018)
(Age)
2 -8.7e-04 -2.1e-04 -8.7e-04 -2.4e-04
(2.4e-04)*** (2.0e-04) (2.6e-04)*** (2.0e-04)
Education -0.021 0.003 -0.023 0.006
(0.010)** (0.013) (0.010)** (0.014)
Wealth 0.013 0.026 0.014 0.025
(0.033) (0.017) (0.034) (0.017)
Income in June < income in Sept. -0.049 0.005 -0.043 0.013
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066)
Farmer 0.081 0.180 0.079 0.186
(0.071) (0.051)*** (0.071) (0.053)***
Negative shock from harvest 0.102 0.124 0.121 0.119
(0.056)* (0.096) (0.056)** (0.097)
Married 0.379 0.173 0.385 0.162
(0.141)*** (0.133) (0.140)*** (0.137)
Household head 0.119 -0.123 0.121 -0.117
(0.157) (0.115) (0.150) (0.113)
Position in the family 0.138 0.143
(0.065)** (0.064)**
(Position in the family)
2 -0.012 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008)




Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Probit, marginal effects reported, 
standard errors corrected for clustering at village level. The dependent variable equals to one, if an individual has 
an outstanding loan from a bank, SHG or moneylender.   46 
Table 15: Having SHG loan 
 
Dependent variable
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Strongly hyperbolic 0.364 0.048 0.225 0.014 0.285 0.029 0.212 -0.018
(0.082)*** (0.037) (0.088)** (0.043) (0.081)*** (0.062) (0.085)** (0.071)
Weakly hyperbolic 0.064 -0.099 0.019 -0.100 0.070 -0.205 0.041 -0.211
(0.087) (0.041)** (0.085) (0.042)** (0.104) (0.074)*** (0.108) (0.075)***
Current discount rate -0.365 -0.104 -0.270 -0.129
(0.145)** (0.106) (0.147)* (0.174)
Future discount rate -0.596 -0.069 -0.397 -0.149
(0.201)*** (0.095) (0.205)* (0.169)
Patient now, impatient in future -0.046 -0.090 0.073 -0.073 0.236 -0.137 0.255 -0.104
(0.113) (0.035)** (0.112) (0.045) (0.073)*** (0.087) (0.068)*** (0.106)
Risk averse 0.056 0.042 0.061 0.041 0.016 -0.005 0.012 -0.007
(0.073) (0.047) (0.073) (0.048) (0.083) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086)
Age 0.072 -0.009 0.072 -0.008 0.041 -0.024 0.044 -0.024
(0.026)*** (0.015) (0.026)*** (0.015) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024)
(Age)
2 -9.1e-04 7.2e-05 -9.1e-04 6.2e-05 -5.1e-04 2.5e-04 -5.5e-04 2.5e-04
(3.1e-04)*** (1.7e-04) (3.2e-04)*** (1.7e-04) (4.4e-04) (2.6e-04) (4.5e-04) (2.7e-04)
Education -0.021 0.002 -0.022 0.003 -0.008 0.004 -0.009 0.004
(0.011)* (0.006) (0.011)** (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
Wealth -0.003 0.012 -0.001 0.012 -0.015 0.014 -0.014 0.014
(0.026) (0.010) (0.027) (0.009) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020)
Income in June < income in Sept. -0.060 0.048 -0.054 0.048 -0.080 0.087 -0.077 0.084
(0.080) (0.049) (0.081) (0.050) (0.097) (0.081) (0.099) (0.084)
Farmer -0.027 -0.060 -0.035 -0.058 -0.078 -0.222 -0.081 -0.223
(0.067) (0.045) (0.066) (0.044) (0.096) (0.110)** (0.096) (0.110)**
Negative shock from harvest 0.170 0.066 0.194 0.062 0.133 0.079 0.140 0.075
(0.086)** (0.054) (0.089)** (0.054) (0.093) (0.089) (0.095) (0.089)
Married 0.271 0.087 0.273 0.086 0.269 0.109 0.289 0.113
(0.102)*** (0.070) (0.108)** (0.072) (0.270) (0.124) (0.270) (0.125)
Household head 0.141 -0.008 0.152 -0.009 0.175 -0.004 0.188 -0.008
(0.191) (0.077) (0.187) (0.077) (0.162) (0.142) (0.157) (0.142)
Position in the family 0.220 0.229 0.228 0.232
(0.064)*** (0.065)*** (0.085)*** (0.088)***
(Position in the family)
2 -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.025
(0.009)** (0.009)** (0.012)** (0.012)**
Observations 249 272 249 272 159 152 159 152
SHG loan
Whole sample Conditional on having a loan
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Probit, marginal effects reported, standard errors 
corrected for clustering at village level. The dependent variable equals to one, if an individual has an outstanding loan 
from SHG. In columns 1-4 the whole sample is included, in columns 5-8 only those with some loan are included. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Hyperbolic preferences and financial behavior with village fixed effects 
Relative to current patience Relative to future patience
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Strongly hyperbolic -0.418 0.745 -0.944 0.116
(0.449) (1.122) (0.440)** (1.187)
Weakly hyperbolic -0.342 -0.704 -0.490 -1.119
(0.529) (1.322) (0.529) (1.351)
Dependent variable
Strongly hyperbolic 0.126 -0.040 -0.038 -0.210
(0.096) (0.100) (0.103) (0.098)**
Weakly hyperbolic 0.012 0.089 -0.026 0.069
(0.123) (0.115) (0.127) (0.119)
Dependent variable
Strongly hyperbolic -0.184 -0.136 0.009 -0.036
(0.087)** (0.126) (0.082) (0.127)
Weakly hyperbolic 0.014 -0.044 0.067 -0.008
(0.099) (0.144) (0.100) (0.146)
Dependent variable
Strongly hyperbolic 0.225 0.171 0.094 0.222
(0.087)** (0.090)* (0.101) (0.090)**
Weakly hyperbolic -0.027 0.126 -0.063 0.162
(0.121) (0.104) (0.124) (0.103)
Dependent variable
Strongly hyperbolic 0.386 0.055 0.209 0.026
(0.098)*** (0.051) (0.105)** (0.045)
Weakly hyperbolic 0.045 -0.063 -0.005 -0.064
(0.125) (0.022)*** (0.124) (0.022)***
Dependent variable
Strongly hyperbolic 0.314 0.038 0.238 -0.021
(0.078)*** (0.092) (0.095)** (0.087)
Weakly hyperbolic -0.007 -0.183 -0.049 -0.187
(0.162) (0.050)*** (0.169) (0.050)***
Current discount rate yes yes no no
Future discount rate no no yes yes
Patient now, impatient in future yes yes yes yes
Observable characteristics yes yes yes yes
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes
SHG loan
SHG loan (conditional on having a loan)
Total savings (Rs. th.)
Future oriented purpose of savings




Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Probit for dependent variables Future 
oriented purpose of savings, Loan, SHG loan and SHG loan (conditional on having a loan); marginal effects 
reported. OLS for Total savings. Tobit (lower limit = 0; upper limit =1) for Share of home savings. In columns 1 
and 2 the current discount rate is controlled for. In columns 3 and 4 the future discount rate is controlled for. In 
all columns we also control for dummy for having future-biased preferences, risk aversion, all other observable 
characteristics used in Tables 11-15 and village fixed effects.   
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Table A2: Hyperbolic preferences and financial behavior: alternative specification 
Dependent variable
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Strongly hyperbolic -1.777 -1.763 0.080 -0.036 -0.185 0.154
(0.640)** (1.451) (0.201) (0.143) (0.188) (0.203)
Weakly hyperbolic -1.247 -2.314 -0.033 -0.012 -0.004 0.273
(0.890) (1.752) (0.130) (0.116) (0.136) (0.182)
Dependent variable
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Strongly hyperbolic 0.030 0.241 0.289 -0.043 0.365 -0.117
(0.124) (0.138)* (0.132)** (0.058) (0.113)*** (0.119)
Weakly hyperbolic -0.079 0.148 0.023 -0.075 0.134 -0.172
(0.138) (0.078)* (0.129) (0.044)* (0.102) (0.071)**
SHG loan SHG loan 
Saving
Borrowing









Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at 
village level. Probit for dependent variables Future oriented purpose of savings, Loan, SHG loan and SHG loan 
(conditional on having a loan); marginal effects reported. OLS for Total savings. Tobit (lower limit = 0; upper 
limit =1) for Share of home savings. Table reports the coefficients after controlling for dummies for each level of 
current discount rate, dummies for each level of future discount rate (as in Ashraf et al. 2006), risk aversion and 
all other observable characteristics used in Tables 11-15.  
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